369. Kant, the King of modern thought, it was who first remarked the frequency in logical analytics of trichotomics or threefold distinctions. It really is so; I have tried hard and long to persuade ...

353. Perhaps it is not right to call these categories conceptions; they are so intangible that they are rather tones or tints upon conceptions. In my first attempt to deal with them,2) I made ...

343. . . . It is impossible to resolve everything in our thoughts into those two elements [of Firstness and Secondness]. We may say that the bulk of what is actually done consists of Secondness — or better, ...

338. The ideas in which Thirdness is predominant are, as might be expected, more complicated, and mostly require careful analysis to be clearly apprehended; for ordinary, unenergetic thought slurs over ...

337. By the third, I mean the medium or connecting bond between the absolute first and last. The beginning is first, the end second, the middle third. The end is second, the means third. The thread of ...

335. Some writers insist that all experience consists in sense-perception; and I think it is probably true that every element of experience is in the first instance applied to an external object. A man ...

332. The triad, feeling, volition, cognition, is usually regarded as a purely psychological division. Long series of carefully planned self-experiments, persistent and much varied, though only qualitative, ...

330. Calling any distinction between two equally decided characters to which no third seems to be coördinate (although a neutrality separates them) a polar distinction, in the external world polar ...

326. A dyad consists of two subjects brought into oneness. These subjects have their modes of being in themselves, and they also have their modes of being, as first and second, etc., in connection ...

325. The idea of second is predominant in the ideas of causation and of statical force. For cause and effect are two; and statical forces always occur between pairs. Constraint is a Secondness. In the ...

324. [There is a category] which the rough and tumble of life renders most familiarly prominent. We are continually bumping up against hard fact. We expected one thing, or passively took it for granted, ...

322. The second category that I find, the next simplest feature common to all that comes before the mind, is the element of struggle. This is present even in such a rudimentary fragment of experience ...

317. The whole content of consciousness is made up of qualities of feeling, as truly as the whole of space is made up of points or the whole of time of instants. 318. Contemplate anything by itself — ...

314. Philosophers, who very properly call all things into question, have asked whether we have any reason to suppose that red looks to one eye as it does to another. I answer that slight differences there ...

313. A mere presentment may be a sign. When the traditional blind man said he thought scarlet must be something like the sound of a trumpet, he had caught its blatancy very well; and the sound is certainly ...

312. One of the old Scotch psychologists, whether it was Dugald Stewart or Reid2) or which other matters naught, mentions, as strikingly exhibiting the disparateness of different senses, that ...

306. By a feeling, I mean an instance of that kind of consciousness which involves no analysis, comparison or any process whatsoever, nor consists in whole or in part of any act by which one stretch of ...

305. Suppose I begin by inquiring of you, Reader, in what particulars a feeling of redness or of purple without beginning, end, or change; or an eternally sounding and unvarying railway whistle; or a sempiterne ...

304. . . . Among phanerons there are certain qualities of feeling, such as the color of magenta, the odor of attar, the sound of a railway whistle, the taste of quinine, the quality of the emotion upon ...

303. The pure idea of a monad is not that of an object. For an object is over against me. But it is much nearer an object than it is to a conception of self, which is still more complex. There must ...

302. The idea of First is predominant in the ideas of freshness, life, freedom. The free is that which has not another behind it, determining its actions; but so far as the idea of the negation of another ...

300. The list of categories, or as Harris,2) the author of Hermes, called them, the »philosophical arrangements,« is a table of conceptions drawn from the logical analysis of thought ...

294. I doubt not that readers have been fretting over the ridiculous-seeming phrase »indecomposable element,« which is as Hibernian as »necessary and sufficient condition« (as if »condition« meant no more ...

293. A thorough study of the logic of relatives confirms the conclusions which I had reached before going far in that study. It shows that logical terms are either monads, dyads, or polyads, and that these ...

288. There can be no psychological difficulty in determining whether anything belongs to the phaneron or not; for whatever seems to be before the mind ipso facto is so, in my sense of the phrase. ...

284. Phaneroscopy is the description of the phaneron; and by the phaneron I mean the collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present to the mind, quite regardless of whether ...

180. This classification, which aims to base itself on the principal affinities of the objects classified, is concerned not with all possible sciences, nor with so many branches of knowledge, but with ...

176. The universally and justly lauded parallel which Kant draws between a philosophical doctrine and a piece of architecture has excellencies which the beginner in philosophy might easily overlook; and ...

135. Upon this first, and in one sense this sole, rule of reason, that in order to learn you must desire to learn, and in so desiring not be satisfied with what you already incline to think, there follows ...

133. Every science has a mathematical part, a branch of work that the mathematician is called in to do. We say, »Here, mathematician, suppose such and such to be the case. Never you mind whether it is ...

130. The science which, next after logic, may be expected to throw the most light upon philosophy, is mathematics. It is historical fact, I believe, that it was the mathematicians Thales, Pythagoras, and ...

126. . . . The kind of philosophy which interests me and must, I think, interest everybody is that philosophy, which uses the most rational methods it can devise, for finding out the little that can as ...

65. There are in science three fundamentally different kinds of reasoning, Deduction (called by Aristotle {synagögé} or {anagögé}), Induction (Aristotle's and Plato's {epagögé}) and Retroduction (Aristotle's ...

40. The critical logicians have been much affiliated to the theological seminaries. About the thinking that goes on in laboratories they have known nothing. Now the seminarists and religionists generally ...

35. Kant's whole philosophy turns upon his logic. He gives the name of logic to the greater part of his Critic of the Pure Reason, and it is a result of the great fault of his logical theory ...

206. There are two functions which we may properly require that Pragmatism should perform; or if not pragmatism, whatever the true doctrine of the Logic of Abduction may be, ought to do these two services. ...

180. At the end of my last lecture I had just enunciated three propositions which seem to me to give to pragmatism its peculiar character. In order to be able to refer to them briefly this evening, I will ...

175. We have already seen 1) some reason to hold that the idea of meaning is such as to involve some reference to a purpose. But Meaning is attributed to representamens alone, ...

171. Concerning the validity of Abductive inference, there is little to be said, although that little is pertinent to the problem we have in hand. Abduction is the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis. ...

167. A generation and a half of evolutionary fashions in philosophy has not sufficed entirely to extinguish the fire of admiration for John Stuart Mill — that very strong but Philistine philosopher whose ...

158. We may now profitably ask ourselves what logical goodness is. We have seen that any kind of goodness consists in the adaptation of its subject to its end. One might set this down as a truism. ...

151. I was remarking at the end of my last lecture that perceptual judgments involve generality. What is the general? The Aristotelian definition is good enough. It is quod aptum natum est praedicari ...

129. I cannot linger more upon the general conception of Normative Science. I must come down to the particular Normative Sciences. These are now commonly said to be logic, ethics, and esthetics. Formerly ...

120. . . . I have already explained 3) that by Philosophy I mean that department of Positive Science, or Science of Fact, which does not busy itself with gathering facts, but merely with learning ...

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115. Where then in the process of cognition does the possibility of controlling it begin? Certainly not before the percept is formed. Even after the percept is formed there is an operation which ...

108. Reasoning cannot possibly be divorced from logic; because, whenever a man reasons, he thinks that he is drawing a conclusion such as would be justified in every analogous case. He therefore ...

102. You may, perhaps, ask me how I connect generality with Thirdness. Various different replies, each fully satisfactory, may be made to that inquiry. The old definition of a general is Generale est ...

93. I proceed to argue that Thirdness is operative in Nature. Suppose we attack the question experimentally. Here is a stone. Now I place that stone where there will be no obstacle between it and ...

77. The three categories furnish an artificial classification of all possible systems of metaphysics which is certainly not without its utility. The scheme is shown in this figure (p. 53). It depends upon ...

41. . . . Be it understood, then, that what we have to do, as students of phenomenology, is simply to open our mental eyes and look well at the phenomenon and say what are the characteristics that are ...

34. It must be understood that all I am now attempting to show is that Pragmatism is apparently a matter of such great probable concern, and at the same time so much doubt hangs over its legitimacy, that ...

25. If I were to go into practical matters, the advantage of pragmatism, of looking at the substantial practical issue, would be still more apparent. But here pragmatism is generally practised by successful ...

14. A certain maxim of Logic which I have called Pragmatism has recommended itself to me for divers reasons and on sundry considerations. Having taken it as my guide in most of my thought, I find ...

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